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Descartes’s Meditations have a covert aim: they are intended to promote the 
principles of his physics. He wrote in a letter to Mersenne: 
 
...I may tell you, between ourselves, that these six Meditations contain all the 
foundations [fondemens] of my physics. But please do not say so, because those 
who favour Aristotle would perhaps have more difficulty in approving them. I 
hope that those who read them will imperceptibly [insensiblement] become 
accustomed to my principles, and recognise the truth in them before they notice 
that they destroy those of Aristotle. (AT III 297-8, CSMK 172, translation 
altered)1 
 
Descartes’s assertion that the Meditations contains the foundations of his physics 
echoes the opening paragraph of the work itself, in which he says that he must start 
afresh from the first foundations if he is to establish anything lasting in the sciences 
(AT VII 17, CSM II 12).2 Doubt about the senses figures prominently in Descartes’s 
quest for the foundations of Cartesian physics. His first step in undermining the old 
foundations underpinning his existing beliefs is to launch a sceptical attack on the 
senses. He writes in the Synopsis: 
 
In the first [meditation], reasons are given for which we can doubt about all 
things, especially material things; that is, as long as we have no other foundations 
for science than those we have had so far. Although the utility of so great a doubt 
is not apparent at first sight, nonetheless it is of the greatest utility in liberating us 
from all prejudices and laying down the easiest way to withdraw the mind from 
the senses [ad mentem a sensibus abducendam]; and finally it brings it about that 
we can have no further doubts about what we afterwards discover to be true. (AT 
VII 12, CSM II 9, translation altered) 
 
Here Descartes identifies withdrawal of the mind from the senses as one of the 
greatest benefits of the First Meditation doubt. But how does this withdrawal serve 
Descartes’s anti-Aristotelian goal of using the Meditations to lay the foundations of 
his physics? Several commentators have rightly pointed out that in Descartes’s view, 
uncritical reliance on the senses leads us to a false ‘sensory image’ of the world, one 
which conflicts with the view required by his physics, and that withdrawal from the 
senses is needed to enable us to correct this false view.3 The most obvious way in 
                                                
1 ‘AT’ citations refer by volume and page number to Oeuvres de Descartes, edited by C. Adam and P. 
Tannery (revised edition, Paris: Vrin/CNRS, 1964-76). ‘CSMK’ citations refer by page number to The 
Philosophical Writings of Descartes Vol. III, translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch 
and A. Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
2 ‘CSM’ citations refer by volume and page number to The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 
translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984-5). 
3 See Daniel Garber, ‘Semel in vita: The Scientific Background to Descartes’ Meditations’ in A. Rorty 
(ed.), Essays on Descartes’ Meditations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p. 92; Gary 
Hatfield, ‘The Senses and the Fleshless Eye’ in A. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Descartes’ Meditations 
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which the two views differ is that the naïve (and Aristotelian) view credits objects 
with sensible qualities resembling our sensory ideas, while the Cartesian view does 
not. Cartesian physics, like the corpuscularianism of Locke and Boyle, posits a world 
of objects possessing only qualities such as shape, size and motion—the mechanistic 
or primary qualities. Our sensations or sensory ideas of colour, heat and other sensible 
qualities are caused by the motions of particles of matter; objects do not have sensible 
or secondary qualities resembling our sensations. Hence, withdrawing sensible 
qualities from the world serves the cause of Cartesian physics.  
 Given that Descartes wants to undermine the assumption that objects have 
sensible qualities resembling our sensory ideas, how is the withdrawal from the senses 
prompted by the First Meditation doubt supposed to achieve this? The most explicit 
account of this process has been offered by Rozemond. On her reading, the First 
Meditation brings about withdrawal from the senses by forcing us to set aside familiar 
sense-based beliefs, including the belief that objects have sensible qualities and the 
belief that physical objects exist.4 The belief in sensible qualities suspended by the 
First Meditation doubts is never subsequently restored. The Third Meditation argues 
that mechanistic qualities are clearly and distinctly perceived, while sensible qualities 
are not. Since we should believe only what we clearly and distinctly perceive, 
Descartes concludes that we can be certain that bodies have mechanistic qualities, but 
that we are not justified in ascribing sensible qualities to them.5 Rozemond calls this 
the “skeptical strategy” for using withdrawal from the senses to remove sensible 
qualities from the world.6 
It is certainly true that Descartes seeks to undermine the view that objects have 
sensible qualities resembling our sensory ideas, and it is surely right to say that the 
sceptical arguments of the First Meditation are important in achieving this goal. But 
certain aspects of the Meditations suggest that the sceptical strategy does not tell the 
whole story about how withdrawal from the senses is supposed to pave the way for 
Cartesian physics.  
According to the sceptical strategy, the arguments of the First Meditation 
suffice for withdrawal from the senses, and ultimately provide the motive force for 
the removal of sensible qualities from the world. But the meditator’s own assessment 
of the force of these doubts is more modest. Having run through the Dreaming and 
Deceiving God arguments, she is satisfied that ‘there is not one of my former beliefs 
about which a doubt may not be properly raised’ (AT VII 21, CSM II 14). Despite 
this, she finds that her former beliefs keep returning; she says that she will ‘never get 
out of the habit of confidently assenting to these opinions, so long as I suppose them 
to be what in fact they are, namely highly probable opinions—opinions which, 
despite the fact that they are in a sense doubtful, as has just been shown, it is still 
much more reasonable [rationi consentaneum] to believe than to deny’ (AT VII 22, 
CSM II 15; emphasis added). The belief that objects have the kinds of qualities they 
present to our senses, including sensible qualities, is surely a prime example of a 
habitual opinion. If the meditator continues to regard such opinions as highly 
                                                                                                                                      
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 46, 56, Gary Hatfield Routledge Philosophy 
Guidebook to Descartes and the Meditations (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 80; Marleen Rozemond, 
‘The First Meditation and the Senses,’ Brit. J. Hist. Phil. 4 (1996), p. 24, and Marleen Rozemond, 
Descartes’s Dualism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 67; and Margaret D. 
Wilson, Descartes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 39 and 104. 
4 Descartes’s Dualism, pp. 65-67. 
5 ‘The First Meditation and the Senses’, p. 24; Descartes’s Dualism, p. 68. 
6 Descartes’s Dualism, p. 66; see also ‘The First Meditation and the Senses’, p. 24. 
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probable, more reasonably believed than denied, despite the arguments of the First 
Meditation, then this suggests that it is only after the First Meditation that the 
meditator discovers that such habitual beliefs are ungrounded.  
This suggestion is borne out by the fact that the Third Meditation contains an 
explicit attack on the meditator’s ‘habitual belief...that there were things outside me 
which were the sources of my ideas and which resembled them in all respects’ (AT 
VII 35, CSM II 25). The upshot of this attack is that the meditator concludes that ‘it is 
not reliable judgement but merely some blind impulse that has made me believe up 
till now that there exist things distinct from myself which transmit to me ideas or 
images of themselves through the sense organs or in some other way’ (AT VII 40, 
CSM II 27). This conclusion represents a strong indictment of the naïve-cum-
Aristotelian assumption that when we sense, we receive resemblances transmitted 
from external objects. It is certainly stronger than the First Meditation conclusion that 
such habitual beliefs are ‘in a sense doubtful’ (AT VII 22, CSM II 15). The 
appearance in the Third Meditation of this explicit attack on the assumption that 
objects resemble sensory ideas is difficult to reconcile with the idea that ‘[t]he 
sceptical arguments question assumptions on which our belief in such [sensible] 
qualities is based, and the upshot of the rest of the Meditations is merely that we are 
not justified in claiming that there are [such qualities]’, as Rozemond suggests.7  
In light of these points, there is reason to seek a fuller account of what 
withdrawal from the senses involves, and of the way in which Descartes uses it to 
promote the cause of his physics. The account developed in this paper emphasises the 
role of the Second Meditation in the process of withdrawing the mind from the senses, 
and locates Descartes’s attack on the naïve-cum-Aristotelian view of the senses in the 
Third Meditation, rather than in the First. I argue that the main goal of Descartes’s 
anti-Aristotelian, pro-physics campaign is to persuade the meditator of his anti-
Aristotelian account of the way in which the senses and the intellect contribute to 
knowledge of the physical world. The abandonment of sensible qualities is a corollary 
of the achievement of this goal, rather than the goal itself.  
 
2 Withdrawing the Mind from the Senses and the First Meditation 
 
Many commentators equate withdrawing the mind from the senses with giving 
reasons to doubt the senses, as Descartes does in the First Meditation.8 The passage 
from the Synopsis (quoted earlier) seems at first to support this reading, since it 
explicitly associates withdrawal from the senses with the First Meditation doubt. But 
what the passage says is that the First Meditation doubt ‘lays down the easiest way 
[viam facillimam sternat] to withdraw the mind from the senses’ (AT VII 12, CSM II 
9; emphasis added). The doubt gives us a way or a method for withdrawing the mind 
from the senses; but a way must be followed, and a method must be applied. So the 
passage is consistent with, if not suggestive of, a view on which withdrawal from the 
senses is a process which begins with the First Meditation, rather than an argument 
which is concluded there. Several other passages provide support for this view.  
                                                
7 Descartes’s Dualism, p. 72, emphasis added; see ‘The First Meditation and the Senses’, p. 24. 
8 Rozemond, for example, holds that withdrawal from the senses is completed when the First 
Meditation arguments for doubting the senses have been given (Descartes’s Dualism, pp. 22, 42, 51). 
Hatfield’s Guidebook gives the title ‘Withdrawing the mind from the senses’ to the chapter on the First 
Meditation. 
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 References to the process of withdrawing the mind from the senses appear 
within the first few lines of the Second, Third and Fourth Meditations. The second 
paragraph of the Second Meditation begins: ‘I will suppose, then, that everything I see 
is spurious [falsa]...I have no senses. Body, shape, extension, movement and place are 
chimeras’ (AT VII 24, CSM II 16; emphasis added). The first sentence of the Third 
Meditation reads, ‘I will now shut my eyes, stop my ears, and withdraw [avocabo] all 
my senses. I will eliminate from my thoughts all images of bodily things, or rather, 
since this is hardly possible, I will regard all such images as vacuous, false and 
worthless’ (AT VII 34, CSM II 24; emphasis added). The Fourth Meditation begins, 
‘During these past few days I have accustomed myself to leading my mind away 
[abducenda] from the senses...The result is that I now have no difficulty in turning my 
mind away from imaginable things and towards things which are objects of the 
intellect alone and are totally separate from matter’ (AT VII 52-3, CSM II 37; 
emphasis added). Finally, there is a striking passage in the Second Set of Replies in 
which Descartes associates withdrawal from the senses with the Second rather than 
the First Meditation. He writes, ‘many people had previously said that in order to 
understand metaphysical matters the mind must be drawn away [abducendam] from 
the senses; but no one, so far as I know, had shown how this could be done. The 
correct, and in my view unique, way [via] of achieving this is contained in my Second 
Meditation’ (AT VII 131, CSM II 94). 
 These texts suggest that the process of withdrawing from the senses continues 
beyond the First Meditation. However, Descartes says that the First Meditation doubt 
lays down the way to this withdrawal. So how do the doubts of the First Meditation 
contribute to the process of withdrawing the mind from the senses? As we saw earlier, 
Descartes has the meditator set out to demolish all her opinions in order to start on 
fresh foundations. This demolition project does not require showing that each belief is 
false. The meditator finds that ‘reason now persuades’ her that she should withhold 
assent from doubtful beliefs as well as from false ones, if she is to find any certainty 
in the sciences; and whole structures of belief can be shown to be doubtful by casting 
doubt on the foundations on which they rest (AT VII 18, CSM II 17). Since the 
meditator holds the naïve-cum-Aristotelian view that most of her beliefs are based on 
the senses, she looks for reasons to doubt the senses (AT VII 18, CSM II 17). Having 
found them, she resolves ‘to withhold my assent from these former beliefs just as 
carefully as I would from obvious falsehoods, if I want to discover any certainty’ (AT 
VII 22, CSM II 15). But the former beliefs ‘keep coming back’; through habit, she 
continues to assent to them (AT VII 22, CM II 150). It is at this point that the 
meditator realises that she will never get out of this habit of assent as long as she 
continues to suppose them to be ‘what in fact they are’, highly probable opinions 
which are much more reasonably believed than denied (AT VII 22, CSM II 15). The 
reasons she has found for doubting her habitual opinions co-exist with what she still 
regards as good reasons for believing them. 
 As Descartes recognises, the meditator’s epistemic situation at this point is a 
psychologically awkward one. It is the fact that she aims to find new foundations for 
the sciences that makes it rational for her to withhold assent from opinions which she 
has seen reason to regard as doubtful; the reasons themselves need not compel a 
suspension of belief. The sceptical arguments show that her former opinions are in 
some way doubtful, but they do not suffice to induce the withholding of assent. Thus, 
the meditator continues to regard her opinions as ‘highly probable.’ This, coupled 
with the fact that she is accustomed to assent to them, makes it difficult for her to
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withhold assent as her project requires. A new measure is needed; the meditator 
decides to ‘pretend for a time that these former opinions are utterly false and 
imaginary’—to ‘deceive myself’, as Descartes puts it (AT VII 22, CSM II 15). This 
device counteracts both the meditator’s tendency to regard her opinions as probable 
and her habit of believing them; it counterbalances ‘the weight of preconceived 
opinion’ and corrects ‘the distorting influence of habit’ (AT VII 22, CSM II 15). 
Descartes compares this to bending a curved stick in the opposite direction in order to 
straighten it (AT VII 349, CSM II 242). Pretending that her habitual opinions are false 
helps the meditator to achieve her aim of withholding assent from them as carefully as 
if they were false.  
  The way in which the pretence is put into effect is important for the process of 
withdrawing the mind from the senses. The meditator decides to pretend that she is 
being deceived by a demon of the utmost power and cunning, who devises delusory 
experience as of ‘the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds and all external 
things’ and makes her falsely believe that she has hands, eyes, flesh, blood and senses 
(AT VII 22-3, CSM II 15). (Note that the pretended deception is focused wholly on 
the senses, though the sceptical arguments themselves were not.) Though the pretence 
is entered into in order to block assent to former opinions, its effect is far broader. It 
induces the meditator to discount the senses entirely, both as a basis for past and 
present belief and as a source of ideas. The opening paragraph of the Third Meditation 
ilustrates this: the meditator resolves to eliminate from her thoughts all images of 
bodily things, or at least to treat such images as worthless (AT VII 34, CSM II 24). 
 Evidently finding reason to doubt the senses is not the same as withdrawing 
the mind from the senses, although the first motivates the second. The meditator finds 
reason to doubt the senses in the First Meditation, having run through the Dreaming 
and Deceiving God arguments. But she has not at this point begun to withdraw her 
mind from the senses. Withdrawing the mind from the senses requires breaking both 
the habit of assenting to former opinions based on sense experience, and the habit of 
relying on sensory ideas, including sensory images, as a basis for belief and a medium 
for thought. The withdrawal is a withdrawal of attention as well as credence from 
sensory ideas.9 The pretence of deceit by a demon provides the meditator with a way 
of turning the mind away from sensory images and habitual sense-based judgements, 
and thus achieves an effect that the sceptical arguments alone cannot produce. In the 
next section we shall look at how Descartes uses this pretence of deceit to draw the 
meditator’s mind towards innate intellectual ideas. 
 
3 Withdrawal from the Senses in the Second Meditation 
 
When Descartes describes the Second Meditation as containing the correct way of 
drawing the mind away from the senses, it is in the context of explaining ‘how the 
                                                
9There are several references in the Meditations and the Replies to shifting attention away from the 
senses to concentrate on intellectual matters. In the Second Replies Descartes alludes to ‘those who, 
following the way indicated by me, lay aside for a time whatever they have acquired from the senses, 
so as to attend to dictates of pure and uncorrupted reason’ (AT VII 154, CSM II 109). This process 
requires effort; ‘only those who really concentrate and meditate and withdraw their minds from 
corporeal things, so far as is possible,’ will achieve perfect knowledge of the primary notions (AT VII 
157, CSM II 111). So in the Third Meditation, the meditator finds that ‘when I relax my 
concentration...my mental vision is blinded by the images of things perceived by the senses’ (AT VII 
47, CSM II 32). She later recalls that she used to be ‘completely preoccupied with the objects of the 
senses’ (AT VII 65, CSM II 45). 
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properties or qualities of mind are to be distinguished from the qualities of body’ (AT 
VII 131, CSM II 94, translation altered). He warns that ‘protracted and repeated study 
is required to eradicate the lifelong habit of confusing intellectual things with bodily 
things, and to replace it with the opposite habit of distinguishing the two; this will 
take at least a few days to acquire’ (AT VII 131, CSM II 94, translation altered). That, 
he says, is why he devoted the whole of the Second Meditation to the way of drawing 
the mind away from the senses to understand metaphysical matters (AT VII 131, 
CSM II 94).  
The meditator resolves early in the Second Meditation to follow the way (via) 
embarked on in the previous Meditation, setting aside anything that admits of doubt. 
As decided in the First Meditation, she pretends that she has no senses, that external 
things are delusions, that no corporeal things exist (AT VII 22-3, 24, CSM II 15, 16). 
The value of this supposition, according to Descartes’s Synopsis, is that ‘it enables the 
mind to distinguish without difficulty what belongs to itself, i.e. to an intellectual 
nature, from what belongs to the body’ (AT VII 12, CSM II 9). Still possessed by the 
lifelong habit of confusing mind and body, at first the meditator thinks, ‘Am I not so 
bound up with a body and with senses that I cannot exist without them?’ (AT VII 25, 
CSM II 16). But then she realises that even if she has convinced herself that nothing 
exists, and even if she is deceived by a demon, she herself must still exist. The 
pretence of deceit, prompted by doubt, has yielded its first certainty.  
In the remainder of the Meditation, the I that now knows of its own existence 
explores its nature, correcting naïve-cum-Aristotelian confusions as it goes. These 
habitual confusions are excised using the pretence of deceit, which enables the 
meditator to withdraw her mind from the senses by setting aside all images of bodily 
things. She reflects that she knows for certain both that she exists, and that the images 
of corporeal things formed in the imagination could be mere dreams (AT VII 28, 
CSM II 19). She concludes that the images formed in her imagination cannot help her 
to understand what a mind is: ‘none of the things that the imagination enables me to 
grasp is at all relevant to this knowledge of myself which I possess’ (AT VII 28, CSM 
II 19).10 And this provides fresh motivation for withdrawing the mind from images of 
sensible things: ‘the mind must therefore be most carefully withdrawn [avocandam] 
from such things if it is to perceive its own nature as distinctly as possible’ (AT VII 
28, CSM II 19, translation altered). 
Despite this resolution, old habits die hard: a paragraph later the meditator 
finds that she ‘cannot stop thinking’ that corporeal things which can be investigated 
with the senses and pictured in the imagination are known more distinctly than ‘this I-
know-not-what me [istud nescio quid mei]’, which cannot be sensed or imagined (AT 
VII 29, CSM II 20, translation altered). Descartes has the meditator confront this 
naïve-cum-Aristotelian prejudice directly, by investigating the way in which she 
understands a particular body, the piece of wax. The investigation culminates in the 
realisation that the natures of wax and mind alike are perceived clearly and distinctly 
not by the senses or the imagination, as the meditator previously thought, but by the 
intellect (AT VII 34, CSM II 22-3). It is the intellect that understands that the wax 
persists through changes in the features grasped by the five senses, and that it can 
persist through more changes in extension than the imagination can encompass. 
Distinguishing what belongs to an intellectual nature from what belongs to body goes 
                                                
10 Descartes wrote in the earlier Discourse that trying to use one’s imagination in order to understand 
the idea of the soul is like trying to use one’s eyes in order to hear sounds (AT VI 37, CSM I 129). 
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hand-in-hand with distinguishing the cognitive roles of the intellect, imagination and 
senses. 
Descartes lays particular stress on the conclusion that the wax is perceived ‘by 
the mind alone [sola mente]’ (AT VII 31, CSM II 21). This realisation enables the 
meditator to correct her habitual misapprehension of the scope of the senses, her naïve 
belief that ‘the wax is known by the vision of the eye, not solely by the inspection of 
the mind’ (AT VII 32, CSM II 21, translation altered). She now knows that 
‘something which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the 
faculty of judgement which is in my mind’ (ATVII 32, CSM II 21). This view reflects 
the conception of sense-perception outlined by Descartes in the Sixth Replies, where 
he distinguishes between three grades of sensing. The first grade is purely physical, 
consisting of motions in the bodily organs; the second is mental, consisting of 
perceptions of pain, hunger, colours, sound, heat and so on (AT VII 436-7, CSM II 
294). Only these first and second grades belong to the senses; the third grade consists 
of judgements made by the intellect, but wrongly attributed to the senses. What 
Descartes calls ‘ordinary ways of talking’ reflect this common error; as he puts it in 
the Second Meditation, ‘we say that we see the wax itself, if it is there before us, not 
that we judge it to be there from its colour and shape, and this might lead me to 
conclude…that knowledge of the wax comes from what the eye sees, not from the 
scrutiny of the mind alone’ (AT VII 32, CSM II 21). In the Sixth Replies, Descartes 
explains that sensing proper ends with the perception of the colour and light reflected 
from a stick, or the wax; the judgement that a stick, or a piece of wax, of a certain 
colour, size and shape lies at a certain distance depends on the intellect, which makes 
use of the information provided by the perceptions of light and colour (AT VII 437, 
CSM II 294). The meditator is not yet in a position to perceive the details of this 
picture of what goes on when we see a body. But she has taken a significant step 
towards the reassessment of the roles of the senses and intellect which will she will 
finally make in the Sixth Meditation.  
This is not the only lesson that the meditator learns from the examination of 
the piece of wax. She also begins to appreciate the difference between a clear and 
distinct intellectual perception and an obscure and confused one. Her new judgement 
about the nature of the wax is clear and distinct, while her previous judgement was 
imperfect and confused (AT VII 31, CSM II 21). When she believed that she knew 
the wax by her external senses, and thought of it in terms of its colour, temperature, 
shape, size and other sensible properties, she did not grasp its nature distinctly; when 
she thinks of it as something extendable in more ways than she can imagine, she 
clearly and distinctly perceives what the wax is. Animals can perceive bodies through 
their senses, but ‘when I distinguish the wax from its outward forms…then although 
my judgement may contain errors, at least my perception now requires a human mind’ 
(AT VII 32, AT II 22).  
Withdrawal from the senses, induced by the pretence of deceit, not only 
enables the meditator to realise what a mind is; it also enables her to realise what a 
mind can do. She begins the Second Meditation with the naïve-cum-Aristotelian 
belief that she is a corporeal being, animated by a soul which is responsible for 
nutrition, locomotion, sensing and thinking (AT VII 26, CSM II 17). She ends it with 
the Cartesian belief that she is a mind, an intellect, a thinking thing, which doubts, 
understands, wills, imagines and senses (AT VII 28, CSM II 19). She begins it with 
the naïve-cum-Aristotelian belief that corporeal things, which can be sensed and 
imagined, are known more distinctly than the mind itself, which cannot. She ends it 
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with the Cartesian belief that ‘even bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses or 
the faculty of imagination but by the intellect [intellectu] alone, and that this 
perception derives not from their being touched or seen but from their being 
understood [intelligantur]’ (AT VII 34, CSM II 22). The turn away from sensible 
images, reinforced at crucial points in the Meditation, has enabled her to perceive 
clearly and distinctly using the intellect alone. The meditator is now in a position to 
compare what she mistakenly took for the distinctness of sensory perception with the 
genuine clarity and distinctness of intellectual perception. As a result, she is also in a 
position to launch a critique of her habitual faith in the senses that is far harsher than 
any enisaged in the First Meditation. 
 
3 Withdrawal from the Senses and the Third Meditation Critique 
 
The Third Meditation opens with a fresh resolution to withdraw the mind from the 
senses, and a fresh exhortation to turn away from sensory images: ‘I will now shut my 
eyes, stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses. I will eliminate from my thought all 
images of bodily things…’ (AT VII 35, CSM II 24). This withdrawal is designed to 
enable the meditator to scrutinise herself, a thinking thing that cannot be perceived 
through the senses. The first fruit of this scrutiny is the proposal of a ‘general rule’: 
that whatever she clearly and distinctly perceives must be true. But there is a 
difficulty with the proposed rule. Many things she used to regard as wholly certain 
and evident have proved to be open to doubt (presumably, in the First Meditation). 
This difficulty is resolved with the realisation that these things were not clearly and 
distinctly perceived, and so do not provide a counterexample to the rule. Her previous 
claim that ‘there were things outside me which were the sources of my ideas and to 
which they were wholly similar’ was not in fact something she perceived clearly, 
although ‘through a habit of believing’ she thought she did so (AT VII 35, CSM II 
25).  
This discovery marks a significant step beyond the doubts about the senses 
aired in the First Meditation. There, the meditator was puzzled by the similarity 
between waking experience and dreaming experience, and could not see how to rule 
out the possibility that an omnipotent God or less powerful originating cause had 
given her a deceitful nature.11 This showed her that doubts could be raised about 
something that she believed she perceived clearly. Here, the meditator realises that 
what she thought she perceived clearly was not so perceived at all. Two results of the 
Second Meditation contribute to this discovery.  
Firstly, Descartes makes use of the distinction between sensory ideas and 
intellectual judgements, drawn in the discussion of the wax, to reframe the 
meditator’s previous belief in things apprehended through the senses. As the 
meditator now describes it, she clearly perceived that ideas or thoughts of ‘the earth, 
sky, stars, and everything else that I apprehended with the senses’ appeared before her 
mind (AT VII 35, CSM II 24). But she also judged that ‘that there were things outside 
me which were the sources of my ideas and to which they were wholly similar 
[omnino similes]’ (AT VII 35, CSM II 25, translation altered). This judgement is the 
                                                
11 I mention this disjunction in order to reflect the argument by dilemma which terminates the 
meditator’s quest for reasons to doubt her former beliefs. The dilemma argument is used to show that 
even if we reject the possibility of an omnipotent creator who has created us such that we are 
constantly deceived, we must countenance the possibility that a less than omnipotent original cause has 
given us a nature that is imperfect and therefore deceitful (AT VII 21, CSM II 14). 
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work of the intellect, not the senses. Secondly, the meditator is now able to recognise 
that this judgement was not based on clear perception, because she now knows what a 
clear intellectual perception is like. The genuine clarity and distinctness of her 
perception that she is a thinking thing, achieved in the Second Meditation and 
reviewed at the start of the Third, enables her to expose the spurious clarity of her 
habitual belief that objects wholly resemble sensory ideas.  
The realisation that this habitual, naïve-cum-Aristotelian belief is not based on 
clear perception is followed up by a detailed scrutiny of the grounds on which it is 
based. Tellingly, the critique is couched in the present tense: ‘what is my reason for 
thinking [my ideas] resemble [external] things?’ (AT VII 38, CSM II 26). Although 
she is pretending that it (and her other sense-based beliefs) is false, the meditator has 
not yet abandoned her habitual belief that bodies wholly resemble sensory ideas. 
The meditator identifies two grounds for this habitual belief that ideas taken to 
be derived from external things resemble them. The first is that nature apparently 
teaches her this—that is, she has a spontaneous impulse to believe it. The second is 
that the ideas occur involuntarily, which suggests that they come from things outside 
her; and ‘the most obvious judgement for me to make is that the thing in question 
transmits to me its own likeness’ (AT VII 38, CSM II 26). Under scrutiny, each of 
these reasons is found wanting. Firstly, unlike the natural light of reason, natural 
impulse cannot be trusted, because it has proved unreliable in the past. Secondly, 
ideas that occur involuntarily might be produced by an unknown internal faculty, just 
as ideas are thought to be produced when we are dreaming. And even if an idea comes 
from an external object, it need not resemble that object (AT VII 39, CSM II 27). 
Here Descartes has the meditator contrast the sensory idea of the sun with an idea 
based on astronomical reasoning. The first represents the sun as very small, while the 
second represents it as many times larger than the earth. Since the idea derived from 
innate geometrical notions has a better claim to represent the sun’s size accurately, 
she concludes that ‘the idea which seems to have emanated most directly from the sun 
itself has in fact the least similarity to it’ (AT VII 39, CSM II 27).  
This critique of the reasons for the habitual belief yields a damning verdict: it 
is ‘merely some blind impulse [that] has made me believe up till now [hactenus] that 
there exist things distinct from myself which transmit to me ideas or images of 
themselves’ (AT VII 40, CSM II 27; emphasis added). As ‘up till now’ indicates, it is 
at this point, rather than in the First Meditation, that the meditator is forced to give up 
her allegiance to the naïve-cum-Aristotelian conception of sense-perception. Her 
belief that sensory ideas come from objects which they wholly resemble is now 
shown to be not just open to doubt but unjustified, and not just unjustified but likely 
(as the sun example shows) to be false. The meditator can no longer describe her 
habitual belief as ‘highly probable’, more reasonably believed than denied, as she did 
following the sceptical arguments of the First Meditation. There, reasons for doubting 
her habitual opinions co-existed with what she still regarded as good reasons for 
believing them; now, her reasons for holding this habitual belief have evaporated 
under scrutiny. 
We are now in a position to see how withdrawal from the senses, pursued in 
the Second and Third Meditation, enables Descartes to expose and criticize the 
grounds for the Aristotelian belief that objects transmit their likenesses to us when we 
sense them. However, the meditator has yet to be introduced to the Cartesian account 
of the way in which the senses contribute to our knowledge of the physical world. 
Earlier I claimed that the main goal of Descartes’s anti-Aristotelian, pro-physics 
Submitted to Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 
 10 
campaign is not to persuade the meditator to abandon sensible qualities, but to 
persuade her of his anti-Aristotelian account of the epistemic role of the senses. To 
see how this is achieved, we must turn to the Sixth Meditation. 
 
4 What Nature Teaches: The Epistemic Role of the Senses  
 
Early in the Sixth Meditation, the meditator decides to consider the mode of thought 
she calls sensing, to see whether this can provide the basis for a ‘sure argument’ for 
the existence of material things (AT VII 74, CSM II 51). She reviews the Third 
Meditation critique, recalling that: 
 
As for the reasons for my previous confident belief in the truth of things perceived 
by the senses, I had no trouble in refuting them. For since I apparently had natural 
impulses towards many things which reason told me to avoid, I reckoned that not 
much trust should be placed in what I was taught by nature. And despite the fact 
that the perceptions of the senses were not dependent on my will, I did not think 
that I should on that account infer that they proceeded from things distinct from 
myself, since I might perhaps have a faculty not yet known to me which produced 
them. (AT VII 77, CSM II 53-4) 
 
In the Third Meditation, the meditator identified two reasons for her habitual belief 
that sense perceptions come from external things which they resemble: that nature 
teaches her to think this (she has a spontaneous impulse to believe it), and that the 
perceptions do not depend on her will (AT VII 38, CSM II 26). She rejected them for 
the reasons reviewed here: natural impulses are untrustworthy, and ideas not under the 
control of her will might yet originate in her. Now, in the Sixth Meditation, the 
involuntariness of sense perceptions and the natural impulse to believe in their 
external origin are put to work to produce a ‘sure argument’ for the existence of 
material things. This argument plays a significant role in advancing Descartes’s anti-
Aristotelian account of the physical world and the way in which we know about it. 
 The ‘sure argument’ follows the well-known passage arguing that the mind is 
a substance that thinks and is not extended, while body is a substance that is extended 
and non-thinking. The meditator beings by reflecting that she can clearly and 
distinctly understand herself as a whole without the faculties of imagining and 
sensing. However, she cannot understand those faculties as existing except in an 
intellectual substance, because 
 
intellection [intellectionem] is included in their essential definition [formali 
conceptu], from which I perceive that they are distinguished from me as modes 
are from a thing [ut modos a re]. (AT VII 78, CSM II 54, translation altered).  
 
Sensing and imagining were conceived of as forms of thinking back in the Second 
Meditation (AT VII 28-9, CSM II 19). Since their essential definition or formal 
concept includes thought, they can be understood only as existing in a thinking 
substance. Descartes now has the meditator reason to the converse claim: that only 
faculties whose definition includes intellection or thought can exist in a thinking 
substance. She reflects that the faculties of changing shape or position cannot exist in 
an intellectual substance, only in an extended one, since the conception of these 
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includes extension, but nothing intellectual (AT VII 79, CSM II 54-5). This converse 
claim is now put to use in the argument for the existence of matter. 
The meditator reflects that she has a passive faculty of sensing, of receiving 
and recognising ideas of sensible things; but this could have no use if there were not 
also some active faculty which brought about these ideas. In the Third Meditation, she 
could not see how to exclude the hypothesis that this faculty lay within herself. Now, 
equipped with a greater knowledge of her own nature, she rules this out on the 
grounds that the faculty of producing sensory ideas presupposes no intellection, and 
that the ideas in question are produced without her co-operation, and even against her 
will (AT VII 79, CSM II 55). Since the faculty of producing sensory ideas 
presupposes no intellectual or voluntary act on the meditator’s part, it cannot exist in 
her as a thinking substance. 
The meditator now knows that the faculty of producing sensory ideas lies in 
some substance distinct from herself. This substance can cause the ideas only if it 
contains, either eminently or formally, all the reality existing objectively in the ideas 
themselves. But this still leaves three alternatives. The cause might be corporeal 
substance, which would contain formally the reality present in sensory ideas, or it 
might be God himself, or some creature more noble than body, either of which would 
contain the requisite reality eminently (AT VII 79, CSM II 55). The second and third 
alternatives are ruled out on the grounds that God has given us a great propensity to 
believe that sensory ideas are sent from corporeal things, and no faculty for 
recognising God or something nobler than body as their source (AT VII 79-80, CSM 
II 55). Given this, God would be a deceiver if these ideas were sent from somewhere 
other than corporeal things (AT VII 80, CSM II 55). Since God is no deceiver, 
corporeal things must exist. 
This argument appeals to a principle made explicit in the paragraph 
immediately following: the principle that since our creator is not a deceiver, there 
cannot be any falsity in our opinions ‘which cannot be corrected by some other 
faculty supplied by God’ (AT VII 80, CSM II 55-6). The veracity of our creator is not 
incompatible with our falling into error, as the Fifth Meditation makes clear, but it is 
incompatible with our falling into incorrigible error. However, the argument does not 
appeal to this principle alone; it also appeals to the fact that God has given us a 
positive inclination, a ‘great propensity’, to believe that sensory ideas come from 
bodies. The meditator could not trust her natural impulse towards this belief in the 
Third Meditation, before she knew her creator. Now that she knows God is not a 
deceiver, she can trust what her nature teaches.  
But there is a caveat to be entered here. In the Third Meditation, the meditator 
described herself as having a spontaneous impulse to believe that sensory ideas came 
from external things ‘to which they were wholly similar [omnino similes]’ (AT VII 35, 
CSM II 25, translation altered, emphasis added). The impulse to believe that sensory 
ideas come from external things has now been legitimized as a teaching of nature, a 
propensity bestowed and hence underwritten by God. But the impulse to believe that 
these external things are wholly similar to the ideas they cause has not so far been 
rehabilitated. As soon as he has argued that material things exist, Descartes warns that 
‘they may perhaps [forte] not all exist wholly [omnino] as they are grasped by the 
senses’, for in many cases this grasp is very obscure and confused (AT VII 80, CSM 
II 55, translation altered, emphasis added). All the meditator can conclude at this 
point is that ‘at least [saltem] all the things that I clearly and distinctly understand 
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[intelligo] are in them, that is all those things, generally viewed, which are comprised 
in the objects of pure mathematics’ (AT VII 80, CSM II 55, translation altered).  
Clearly this conclusion takes the meditator a long way towards the 
mechanistic view of the world required by Cartesian physics. Indeed, if Descartes 
were pursuing the sceptical strategy outlined by Rozemond, it would take him all the 
way there. According to the sceptical strategy, withdrawing from the senses means 
coming to doubt the senses, and in particular to doubt that objects have the kinds of 
qualities they present to our senses. Once this is done, in the First Meditation, the 
meditator must find arguments for the existence and nature of the physical world. In 
the Third Meditation, she learns that one kind of qualities objects present to our 
senses (mechanistic qualities) are clearly and distinctly perceived, while the other 
kind (sensible qualities) are not; so when she argues for the existence of bodies in the 
Sixth Meditation, she only concludes that they exist insofar as they have first kind.12 
Thus the mechanistic conception of objects required by Descartes’s physics is 
established. 
However, it seems too strong to say that the purely mechanistic view of bodies 
is established at this point. The meditator’s conclusion is tentative: perhaps the bodies 
that cause sensory ideas do not wholly resemble those ideas, though they have at least 
the mechanistic properties that we clearly and distinctly understand.13 This wording 
seems specifically designed to leave open the possibility of some further resemblance 
between bodies and our ideas.14 Moreover, such caution seems appropriate at this 
point in the meditator’s progress. Firstly, our propensity to believe that sensory ideas 
are caused by corporeal things has just been used to support the conclusion that 
sensory ideas are caused by such things. The status of our impulse to believe that 
bodies resemble sensory ideas has not yet been determined. For all the meditator 
knows, this impulse might support the conclusion that bodies in some way resemble 
the ideas they cause; they might even have sensible qualities. Secondly, the meditator 
needs to know more about how the content of sensory ideas is related to their external 
causes. What she has learned so far is too general to enable her to determine the 
layout of the physical world. She knows that the corporeal things that cause her 
sensory ideas have properties such as extension, shape, size, number and motion, 
properties which she clearly and distinctly understands. In other words, her 
intellectual understanding of body as extended substance provides a blueprint for 
understanding the corporeal world. But the meditator does not yet know how to use 
sensory ideas to determine which shapes, sizes and motions to attribute to particular 
bodies. She does know how to use the senses to discover the structure of the physical 
world as it actually exists.  
                                                
12 See Rozemond, ‘The First Meditation and the Senses’, p. 24 and Descartes’s Dualism, p. 68. 
13 For this reason, it seems too strong to say that the Fifth Meditation argument that extension 
constitutes the nature of body is intended to ‘give us a definitive refutation of the commonsense 
claim…that bodies resemble our sensory ideas of them’ (Garber, ‘Semel in vita’, p. 103; see Hatfield, 
‘The Senses and the Fleshless Eye’, p. 67, for a similar suggestion). Descartes, at least, thinks he still 
has to argue that we have no justification for attributing additional sensible qualities to bodies, and 
goes on to do so in the Sixth Meditation. 
14 I say ‘further resemblance’ because the argument for the existence of material things already 
exploits a claim of resemblance between sensory ideas and their causes: that all the reality existing 
objectively in sensory ideas must exist formally in the corporeal nature that causes them. Of course it is 
not immediately obvious how to read this claim; for discussion, see Kenneth Clatterbaugh, ‘Descartes’s 
Causal Likeness Principle’, Phil. Rev. (1980) 89: 379-402. 
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Since her knowledge of bodies is incomplete in these two ways, the meditator 
goes on to ask, ‘What of the other things which are either particular, for example that 
the sun has a certain size or shape, etc., or less clearly understood, such as light or 
sound or pain, and so on?’ (AT VII 80, CSM II 55, translation altered). She has ‘a 
sure hope’ that she can attain the truth even here. Firstly, any falsity in her opinions 
must be corrigible by the use of another God-given faculty; she is incapable of 
incorrigible error. Secondly, since her nature is bestowed on her by a non-deceiving 
God, everything that she is taught by nature must contain some truth (AT VII 80, 
CSM II 55-6). This second point is particularly important, because it refutes her 
earlier thought that ‘not much trust should be placed in what I was taught by nature’ 
(AT VII 77, CSM II 53). She can put her trust in what is taught by the nature 
bestowed on her by God, but she must be careful to distinguish genuine from spurious 
teachings of nature, and to identify the truth contained in the genuine teachings.  
The meditator immediately identifies some things that she is genuinely taught 
by nature: that she has a body with which she is intermingled; that other bodies exist 
in its vicinity; that these bodies are capable of affecting the mind-body unit in 
favourable and unfavourable ways; and that they differ in ways corresponding to the 
variations in her sensory ideas of colours, sounds, smells, tastes, heat and so on, 
though perhaps not in ways resembling these ideas (AT VII 81, CSM II 56). 
However, there are also 
 
many other things which I may appear to have been taught by nature, but which in 
reality I acquired not from nature but from a habit of making ill-considered 
judgements; and it is therefore quite possible that these are false. (AT VII 82, 
CSM II 56). 
 
The examples of habitual belief which Descartes goes on to give flow from the 
assumption identified in the Third Meditation, the assumption that sensory ideas 
wholly resemble their external causes. He cites the belief that spaces in which nothing 
stimulates our senses are empty, that heat in a body exactly resembles the sensation of 
heat, that the same whiteness or greenness we sense exists in white or green bodies, 
and that stars, towers and other distant objects have the same size and shape they 
present to the senses (AT VII 82, CSM II 56-7). It is evident from this list, as it is 
from the size of the sun example in the Third Meditation, that the assumption of 
resemblance that is Descartes’s target is not simply the assumption that bodies have 
sensible qualities resembling sensory ideas. It is the assumption that they are exactly 
like the sensory ideas they cause; that bodies have the very shape and size they 
present to our senses, as well as the very greenness or whiteness they present to our 
senses. To assess this assumption, the meditator must clarify what is meant by saying 
that something is taught by nature. Descartes has her distinguish between the solely 
mental and solely physical aspects of her nature on the one hand, and her nature as a 
composite of mind and body on the other (AT VII 82, CSM II 57). The question is 
what her nature as a composite teaches her about things external to her body.15 The 
                                                
15The meditator has earlier noted that she can clearly and distinctly understand herself as a whole 
without the faculties of sensation and imagination (AT VII 78, CSM II 54). She has also noted that her 
sensations of pain, hunger and thirst arise from the union of her mind and her body, and that the 
pleasantness and unpleasantness of her sensory perceptions of external bodies show that the union can 
be affected by those bodies. The idea that sensation (and imagination, see AT VII 73, CSM II 51) 
belongs to a mind insofar as it is combined with a body is thus present in the background. 
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answer is that it teaches her to pursue what induces pleasurable sensations and to 
avoid what induces painful sensations; these sensations show that the external objects 
which induce them are capable of affecting the mind-body composite in favourable 
and unfavourable ways. But it does not teach her to draw conclusions about external 
objects from sensory ideas before the intellect has examined the matter (AT VII 82, 
CSM II 57). (This is what happens in childhood, in Descartes’s view.) Instead, the 
meditator reasons, ‘knowledge of the truth about such things seems to belong to the 
mind alone [ad mentem solam]’, not to the composite (AT VII 83, CSM II 57, 
emphasis added).  
Descartes’s wording here echoes the passage in the Second Meditation where 
the meditator discovered that the piece of wax is perceived not by the senses or 
imagination, but by ‘the mind alone [sola mente]’ (AT VII 31, CSM II 21). There she 
realised that her understanding of the wax as an extended body derived not from the 
senses or from the imagination, but from the intellect—the mind alone, as contrasted 
with the faculties belonging to the mind-body composite. It is the intellect that 
distinguishes the wax as extended thing from the outward forms it presents to the 
senses (AT VII 32, CSM II 22). In the Second Meditation, Descartes contrasted ‘what 
the eye sees’ with ‘what the mind judges’; we judge that the wax is there from its 
colour and shape (which, presumably, we sense), we do not see that it is there with 
our eyes alone. He now exploits a similar contrast in examining the case of the distant 
star:  
 
although a star has no greater effect on my eye than the flame of a small light, that 
does not mean that there is any real or positive propensity [propensio] in me to 
believe that the star is no bigger than the light; I have simply made this judgement 
from childhood onwards without any rational basis. (AT VII 83, CSM II 57, 
translation altered) 
 
Knowledge of the underlying structure of the physical world, including the size and 
shape of external bodies, belongs to the mind or intellect alone. So although we have 
since childhood made the assumption that knowledge of this structure can simply be 
read off sensory ideas, we are wrong to do so. The impulse to affirm that bodies 
wholly resemble sensory ideas is not a real propensity (‘propensio’) bestowed by 
God, like the propensity to believe that sensory ideas are caused by bodies; it derives 
solely from habit. Doubtless it would be helpful if Descartes had said more about how 
cases of habitual belief are to be discriminated from cases of propensity to believe. 
But at least we can see how in the case of the size of the star, like the case of the size 
of the sun, we are able to correct our habitual error by the use of our faculty of reason. 
As Descartes noted in the Third Meditation, we can correct our habitual judgement 
about the size of the sun using astronomical reasoning (AT VII 39, CSM II 27).  
The point Descartes seeks to emphasise through the examination of these 
cases is a point about the epistemic roles of the intellect and the senses. Sensory 
perceptions are given to us to inform the mind of what is beneficial or harmful for the 
mind-body composite. To use them as touchstones for immediate judgements about 
the essences of external bodies, to think that the underlying structure of the world can 
simply be read off sensory perceptions, is to misuse such perceptions (AT VII 83, 
CSM II 57-8). The naïve-cum-Aristotelian belief that external things are just as they 
appear to our senses, that they wholly resemble sensory perceptions, is a 
rationalisation of this habit of misusing sensory perceptions as touchstones for 
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immediate judgements. The beliefs that the sun is small, that heat in a body resembles 
the sensation of heat, that spaces in which nothing stimulates our senses are empty, 
are acquired through this habit of using sensory perceptions uncritically as a basis for 
rash judgements about external things. When the intellect—the mind alone—
examines such habitual beliefs, we discover that there is no convincing argument for 
supposing that there is something in the fire that resembles the sensation of heat (AT 
VII 38, CSM II 26), any more than there is a convincing argument for supposing that 
distant stars are small or that spaces where nothing stimulates our senses are empty. A 
body which produces sensations of heat simply differs in some way from a body 
which does not; and a space in which nothing stimulates our senses is just that (AT 
VII 83, CSM II 57). To judge that the body differs by possessing a quality which 
resembles the feeling of heat, or that the space contains no body, is to make an ill-
considered judgement which is not supported by reason. 
 We can now identify what Descartes regards as the mistake that is made by 
those who affirm that the world is just as it appears to our senses. Their fundamental 
error is not that of assenting to obscure and confused ideas of sensible qualities, but 
that of mistaking the epistemic roles of the senses and the intellect. The senses are 
given to us as guides to benefits and harms; they are not reliable guides to the 
essential natures of external bodies. Thus the naïve-cum-Aristotelian view that objects 
wholly resemble our sensory ideas is misguided not only because it leads to the 
attribution of sensible qualities to bodies, but also—and more importantly—because it 
stems from a false view of the epistemic role of the senses, one which assigns to them 
functions which properly belong to the intellect. It is by allowing the senses to usurp 
the functions of the intellect that the meditator is guilty of ‘perverting the order of 
nature’, as Descartes describes it (AT VII 83, CSM II 57, translation altered).  
 
5 Withdrawal from the Senses and Cartesian Physics 
 
How does the withdrawal from the senses prompted by the First Meditation doubt 
help to lay the foundations for Cartesian physics? That is the question with which we 
originally began. On the account of Descartes’s strategy developed here, withdrawing 
from the senses means ignoring and discounting past and present sensory experience. 
As a result of withdrawing from sensory images, the meditator learns in the Second 
Meditation to form clear and distinct intellectual perceptions; and by comparing these 
with her previous belief that external objects as wholly similar to sensory ideas, she 
realises that it was not based on clear perception, as she thought. The critique of her 
belief in the Third Meditation reveals that she has no good reason for supposing that 
sensory perceptions are caused by external objects which they wholly resemble. In the 
Sixth Meditation she finds good reason to believe that sensory perceptions are caused 
by external objects with mechanistic properties. But there is still no good reason to 
suppose that these objects are just as they appear to the senses; sensory perceptions 
are intended as guides to the ways in which they can affect the mind-body composite. 
Such perceptions must be interpreted by the intellect before they can yield knowledge 
of the true nature of the physical world. 
As a result of withdrawing from the senses, the meditator learns that the 
physical world is not just as it appears to our senses. This corrects naïve-cum-
Aristotelian errors which conflict with Descartes’s physical views: for example, the 
meditator will no longer assume that empty space contains no body. But more 
importantly, she arrives at a new understanding of the epistemic roles of the senses 
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and intellect; and this serves Descartes’s physics and corrects naïve-cum-Aristotelian 
errors in a more fundamental way. The meditator comes to see how to use the senses 
and intellect to arrive at a true understanding of the physical world. Our knowledge of 
the fundamental nature of that world does not come from the senses, but from the 
clear and distinct intellectual idea of extension. But this idea cannot tell us which 
particular configurations of extension exist around us, nor which effects they produce; 
although we cannot determine the true size of the sun simply from our sensory idea of 
it, we cannot determine it without information derived from the senses. Sensory 
perceptions contain information about the nature of the bodies around us, but in an 
obscure and confused form. So although the nature of these bodies cannot simply be 
read off sensory perceptions, the intellect can work this out using information 
extracted from them. This is the task of the Cartesian physicist. 
 One obvious way in which the naïve-cum-Aristotelian conception of the world 
differs from that of Descartes is over the nature of physical objects. According to the 
naïve view, objects have sensible qualities resembling our idea of them; according to 
Descartes’ view, they are simply configurations of extension. This contrast is familiar 
to us as an instance of the contrast between the manifest and the scientific image of 
reality, and this makes it tempting to see Descartes’s attack on the senses as 
essentially an attack on sensible qualities. But Descartes is not simply concerned to 
use withdrawal from the senses to withdraw sensible qualities from the world. Firstly, 
the idea of corporeal nature as extension which provides the meditator’s new 
understanding of the physical world is innate in the intellect, not derived from the 
senses; and the mind must be drawn away from its preoccupation with the senses 
before this idea can be discerned (AT VII 64, CSM II 44-5). Secondly, the moral of 
the reassessment of the epistemic role of the senses in the Sixth Meditation is not that 
we should endorse sensory ideas of mechanistic qualities and reject sensory ideas of 
sensible qualities, but that we should recognise that it is the intellect, not the senses, 
which discerns the truth about external bodies. The intellect uses its innate idea of a 
body as a configuration of extension to interpret sensory perceptions; it does not 
extract its idea of the fundamental nature of bodies from sensory perceptions. The 
order of nature is restored when the meditator who began with the view that the 
senses are the source of truth (AT VII 18, CSM II 12) finally learns that knowledge of 
the truth belongs to the intellect alone (AT VII 82, CSM II 57).16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
16 Ancestors of this paper were presented at seminars at Birkbeck and at Sheffield, and I am grateful to 
those who made comments on those occasions. I am especially grateful to Susan James and Jennifer 
Hornsby for helpful comments on an earlier version. 
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